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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Baxterset forth and established that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing his claim that Idaho Code 9 18-7018 is unconstitutional. Additionally, Mr. 
Baxter explained how he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel 
failed to argue the Twin Falls Criminal Justice Facility itself had not been injured by his conduct 
and because his appellate counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct 
appeal. In response, the State agrees the district court dismissed Mr. Baxter's constitutional 
challenge to Idaho Code 5 18-7018 for reasons other than those for which Mr. Baxter was put on 
notice but nevertheless suggests the district court's error was harmless. Similarly, the State 
argues Mr. Baxter did not receive ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. The State's 
arguments in this respect however are premised upon the flawed reasoning of the district court 
and its misunderstanding of Idaho's injuring jails statute. 
A. The District Court Erred in Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Baxter's Claim Alleging that 
Idaho Code 6 18-701 8 was Unconstitutional on Grounds Different from Those Previously 
Asserted by the State or Adoated by the District Court. 
As explained in his Opening Brief, and as the State's concedes it its responsive briefing, 
Mr. Baxter's claim relating to the constitutionality of Idaho Code 5 18-701 8 was dismissed for 
reasons other than those contained in the notice of intent to dismiss. It is well settled that 
dismissing a petition for grounds not asserted in the twenty-day notice is reversible error. See, 
e.g., DeRuslze v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009). Still, the State argues 
"[alny error in the lack of notice is harmless, however, because Baxter's constitutionality claim 
ultimately fails as a matter of law, and no legal authority or cvidence Baxter could have presented 
would have overcolne summary dismissal of his claim." Brief of Respondent, p.7 (citations 
Interestingly, when confronted with similar circuinstances on at least one prior occasion 
this Court has said such an "error by the district court cannot be held to be harmless, and the 
order summarily dismissing [the petitioner's] application must be vacated." Downing v. State, 
132 Idaho 861,864,979 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999). InDowning, the district court's 
notice of dismissal siinply recited Idaho Code $ 19-4906(b). Id. h1 response, Downing 
submitted additional affidavits even though the notice of intent to dismiss provided no guidance 
as to the district court's rationale for dismissal. Id. The district court dismissed Downing's 
application for post-conviction relief anyway. Id. Downing appealed the summary dismissal and 
this Court stated: 
The opportunity for an applicant to adequately and appropriately respond to the 
district court's notice, in order to avoid summaw dismissal and have the merits of 
his or her application considered at an evidentiary hearing, is a substantial right. 
When that right is affected by a defective notice of proposed dismissal, this Court 
cannot disregard the error. 
Id. 
Similarly, the district court's error in this case should not be disregarded. Mr. Baxter was 
put on notice that the district court intended to dismiss his claim that Idaho Code $ 18-7018 was 
unconstitutional "for the reasons set forth in the State's brief." Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post 
Conviction Petition, p.3. R. 90. The reasons set forth in the State's brief were that "his 
allegations were conclusory." Motion for Summary Disposition, p.8. R. 77. Mr. Baxter's 
constitutional challenge was summarily dismissed though because the district court deteimined 
Mr. Baxter should have raised this claim in direct appeal. Order Dismissing Portion of Petition 
and Directing Hearing, p.2. R. 102. 
To begin with, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Baxter should have addressed the 
2 
constitutionality of Idaho Code 5 18-7018 on direct appeal is wrong. Mr. Baxter could not have 
raised this issue on direct appeal because trial counsel failed to challenge the validity of the 
statute. State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 585, 199 P.3d 155, 160 (Ct. App. 2008) ("It is well 
settled that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling 
that forms the basis for assignment of error.") (citations omitted) 
Moreover, the State's assertion that the district's court error is harmless because there 
was no legal argument or evidence that Mr. Baxter could have proffered had he been given 
proper notice is incorrect. To the contrary, the injuring jails statute, which, as Mr. Baxter pointed 
out in his Opening Brief, was originally enacted by the Idaho territorial legislature in 1864, is ripe 
for a constitutional challenge 
It is a basic principle of due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article 1, 5 13 of the Idaho Constitution, 
that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. 
City ofRoclfooi-d, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 710,69 P.2d 126, 
132 (2003). Due process requires that all be informed as to what the state commands or forbids 
and that people of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of a criminal law. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 71 1,69 P.2d at 133 
In Grayned, the United States Supreme Court indicated: 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discri~~linatory enforcement is 
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. 
A vague law ilnpennissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109 
"As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define 
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983). See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 148-49, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628 (2007); Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 
51 1 U.S. 513, 525 (1994). Due process requires that the statute in question inform citizens of 
what the state comlnands or forbids such that persons of common intelligence are not forced to 
guess at the meaning of the criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 
(1998). "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, and differ as to its 
application, violates the first essential of due process of law." State v. Marel, 112 Idaho 860, 
866,736 P.2d 1314,1320 (1987). 
Furthermore, "[a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, 
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application." Grayned v. City of Rocyord, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 
(1972) (footnote omitted). 
A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent 
vagueness test will be applied where a statute imposes a criminal penalty or if the law interferes 
with a substantial amount of conduct protected by the First Amendment. State v. Cobb, 132 
Idaho 195, 199, 696 P.2d 244, 248 (1998); see also Village of Hosfman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). If the law does not regulate a significant 
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amount of constitutionally protected conduct, the court must determine (1) whether the law gives 
notice to those who are subject to it, and (2) whether the law contains guidelines and imposes 
sufficient discretion on those who must enforce it. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 198, 696 P.2d at 247. 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
defendant's conduct. The statute at issue here reads: 
Every person who wilftilly and intentionally breaks down, pulls down or 
otherwise destroys or injures any public jail or other place of confinement, is 
punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and by imprisonment in the state prison 
not exceeding five years. 
I.C. 18-7018. Mr. Baxter could have raised both a vague on its "face" challenge, because the 
statute requires those of ordinary intelligence to guess as to its meaning, as well as an "as 
applied" challenge, because the statute, as applied to Mr. Baxter's conduct, failed to provide fair 
notice that his conduct was proscribed. State v. Kovsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. 
In sum, the district court's error is not harmless. Had Mr. Baxter been provided proper 
notice he could have responded accordingly. As such, the order summarily dismissing Mr. 
Baxter's claim that Idaho Code 9 18-7018 is unconstitutional should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for further proceedings on those issues. 
B. The District Court Erred in Finding that Trial Counsel Did not Provide Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel by Failing to Argue that Mr. Baxter Did Not Iniure the Jail. 
Mr. Baxter explained in his Opening Brief how he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his trial counsel inexplicably failed to argue that Mr. Baxter did not violate Idaho 
Code 5 18-7018 because he did not injure the jail and instead merely damaged a leased 
telephone. In response the State agrees with the dlslrict court's conclusion that Mr. Baxter's trial 
counsel was not deficient. In order to do so however the State relies upon the district court's 
flawed interpretation and analysis of Idaho Code 9 18-7018. 
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As discussed in Mr. Baxter's Opening Brief, contrary to the plain and ordina~y reading of 
the statute, contrary to Idaho precedent, and contrary to persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions, the district court reasoned that a person is guilty of violating Section 18-7018 even 
though the structure of the jail was not injured or damaged. To reach this conclusion the district 
court was forced to engage in judicial activism and expand the scope of the injuving jails statute 
to now include damage to any "property [that] is integral to the operation of the jail." Order 
Dismissing Post Conviction Petition, p.7. R. 11 1. 
One ofthe flaws in this analysis is exposed in the State's argument. The State asserts 
"[tlhe language of the statute itself does not include as an element ownership of injured or 
damaged properly," therefore, as the district court held, trial counsel would have been precluded 
from arguing that Mr. Baxter did not damage the jail itself. Brief of Respondent, p.15. The State 
is correct in that ownership is not an element of the crime at issue here. The reason ownership is 
not an element becomes evident after some basic legal research. It not an eleinent of the crime 
because the injuring jails statute only applies to injury or damage done to the jail structure itself 
and not the leased fixtures or furniture within the jail. See Opening Brief, pp.10-13. Yet Mr. 
Baxter's trial counsel failed to make this argument either in a motion to dismiss, a Rule 29 
motion, or even to the jury, and in failing to do so trial counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard or reasonableness as articulated in Stvickland. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
The State's, as well as the district court's, attempt to expand the scope of Idaho's injuring 
jails statute in order to sustain the conviction in this case and thereby somehow bootstrap trial 
counsel's competency above the co~lstitutionally acceptable threshold has the unjust consequence 
of leaving Mr. Baxter convicted a crime he did not commit. Arguably Mr. Baxter's conduct 
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violated the malicious injury to property statute, Idaho Code 3 18-7001, but he did not commit 
the crime of injuring jails. 
Nevertheless, the district court's application of the law to the facts of this case are in error 
and subject to free review from this Court. Thus, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order denying Mr. Baxter's application for post-conviction relief, vacate the judgment of 
conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial with counsel. 
C. The District Court Erred when it Concluded Mr. Baxter did not Receive Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel on Direct Ameal Because it was Obiectivelv Unreasonable for 
Amellate Counsel to Not Challenge the Sufficiencv of the Evidence. 
Again, relying upon the rationale orthe district court, the State simply argues Mr. Baxter 
was not prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to challenge the sufficiency of evidence on 
appeal because "such an argument would have been unsuccessful under the [district] court's view 
that the phone destroyed by Baxter was a part of the jail sufficient to warrant a charge of injury to 
jails." Brief of Respondent, p.16. Without repeating them here but for the same reasons set fol-th 
above, as well as those explained in Mr. Baxter's Opening Brief, the district court's application 
of the law and conclusion are in error. Mr. Baxter's appellate counsel's performance was 
deficient and there is a reasonable probability that but for this deficiency the result of his appeal 
would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Baxter's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court's orders denying his petition for post-conviction relief and vacate the 
judgment of conviction and afford Mr. Baxter a new trial with counsel or alternatively remand 
for further post-conviction proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this fi day of March, 2010. 
Attotie$ for Joseph Baxte~ 
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